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Altruism

ALTRUISM
Altruism is reflected in actions by one individual
that benefit another, even when there is no expectation of reward. Altruism is often equated with
selflessness and contrasted with selfishness, or
alternatively, altruism is seen as other-regarding as
opposed to self-regarding behavior. The latter
usage is sometimes preferred because of difficulties
in classifying behavior for which the individual
acting altruistically receives a "warm glow" from
helping others. The question raised in th is instance
is whether such an individual is a tua ll y el.fish
and, if so, whether there is any behavior that, afre r
the fact, could not be interpreted as selfish.
The need to preserve altruism as a meaningful
behavioral category leads to an emphasis on objective, observable measures of welfare. Thus, an
individual who sacrifices health, material wealth,
or physical comfort to benefit another can be
viewed as exhibiting altruism whether or not he or
she receives personal satisfaction from doing so. In
biology, altruism refers to behavior by an organism
that improves the reproductive fitness of another
at the cost of reducing the reproductive fitness of
the actor. This entry discusses altruism as it has
been explained and defined over the years.

Explaining Altruism
Philosophers and behavioral scientists continue to
ask whether humans have innate tendencies

toward altrui m or whether proclivities in th t
dire rion arc rhc result of ocia l.izatic n or accu lturation alone. ne view is that any such behavior
i purely the conseque11 e of a thin veneer of civilization." Rend that fabric, and huma ns wi ll b at
each other's throats, tearing each other apart· for
the ~lighte r advantage.
On see thi - in Sigmund Fr ud ~s wo rk (e.g.,
iuilization and Its Discontents)i in literature
(Robert
lding' Lord of the Flies) and in much
trad ition al ocio logy and anthropology. The probI m with rh i view is that, based on the arc heol gica l re o.rd, it i difficu lt to push the ability c: f
lwrn ::rn and their pr genito r to develop and
transmit culture across generation fur tb r back
than
0,000 years or, at a maximum (ha ed on
vid nc
f the use of fire) perhaps 1 million
year . Language abi lit ies are almost c rtainly 1T1uch
me re recent. And yet the common ancestor of the
three , urviving himpanzee species-Homo sapiens Pan troglodytes (the c mmon chimp)) and Pan
paniscus (bonobos)-who li ved rough ly 7 mi llion
year ago, must have exercised som restraint on
hMming oth r mem ber of th
ame s pecie
(conspe ifics).
By far them st important aspect of altruism a
Al x:and r J. Field points out in hi s b k
/\ltruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences,
volutionary Theory, and the
rtgms
l
Reciprocity i not harming oth rs wh 11 doing so
an be justified defen ively (as a means of for sta lling ·1ttack) and, further as a mea ns of acquir ing
more res urc s. In most instance ·, on an onfer
mu h greater ben fits by not barming ·m other as
opp ·ed ro affirmatively helping.
ne of th key rea lm within which to observe
altrni 111 i the family. Evolurionasy biologi ·ts
approa h the phen men n of altruism geneti a ll y,
viewing individual organjsm a , in a sense, envelo pes r v se l for genes. Genes th mselve have no
theory of mind or independent voli tion, but the
theory of natural selection rell.s u that :renes pred i posing toward behavior that increase th ir frequ n y in subsequent generations she uld he favored.
In m t case , the " interests" f the ge ne in
increa in Tits fr qu n y over tim and t he interests
of the organ ism in survival and rep rod uction are
the same. But n t Iway , and that, from a bi )[ gical p rspective i the probl em of altruism . uppose
gene pr disp
cowa rd behavi.or that might
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reduce the survival probabilities or reproductive
success of the individual while helping another.
How could such genes gain a foothold and increase
in frequency within a population?
In the 1960s, William Hamilton proposed an
elegant solution to the problem of explaining how
such genes could become established. It is a commonplace observation that parents are often prepared to sacrifice their material welfare or, in some
cases, even their lives, for their children. Because
biological children share half the genes of a parent,
a gene predisposing to sacrifice could increase in
frequency if such behavior tended to lead to the
survival of at least two offspring (or two siblings
or eight first cousins and so on).
Hamiltonian kin selection is today widely
understood as a key part of the explanation of
altruism within families. In other words, tendencies toward parental sacrifice have a hardwired
component; they are not purely a cultural construct. Indeed, such behaviors can be observed
throughout the animal kingdom, including among
species that do not have the ability to develop and
transmit culture.
The more difficult challenge is to explain altruism beyond the immediate family. Genetic relatedness drops off quickly-first cousins share just an
eighth of each other's genetic makeup-so even in
the small bands of 50 to 100 hunter-gatherers out
of which human society emerged, kin selection by
itself is too weak a force to explain the emergence
of the cooperation essential for group survival.
Cooperation is not the same as altruism, but it
depends on altruistic predispositions in order to
get started. Why? Because a self-regarding individual not already embedded in a fabric of reciprocal interaction faces a Prisoner's Dilemma, that is,
the dilemma of deciding whether or not to cooperate (e.g., refrain from attacking) when confronting
a stranger for the first time. Attacking first and
asking questions later has much to recommend it
from the standpoint of both prudence and wealth
maximization. The worst outcome would be to sit
tight and be attacked (since offense often has an
advantage). The best for each individually would
be to attack while the other sat tight.
The next best outcome (and the best for the two
individuals considered jointly) would be to refrain
mutually from attack, which would open up the
possibility of beneficial cooperation and exchange.
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The next-to-worst outcome would be for each to
attack the other. The dilemma is that the best
response to whatever the other does is to attack,
even though this leads away from the outcome
that is collectively the most beneficial.

Influence of Genes
It is easy to understand how gene(s) predisposing
toward attack might be favored, particularly if
being attacked while sitting tight means death. It is
more difficult to understand how genes favoring
restraint could be favored. Several approaches
have been proposed. The first is to argue that the
restraint necessary to allow initial cooperation
among those not closely related is simply an extension of the operation of kin selection within small
groups. But this involves a certain amount of hand
waving since, as has been shown, genetic relatedness falls off too quickly for this to be a complete
explanation of how the behavior originated.
The second approach is associated with the
work of Robert Trivers, who developed the theory
of reciprocal altruism. Here, the idea is that if A at
small cost can confer a large benefit on B, then B,
being grateful, might at some small cost return the
favor at a subsequent point. But this does not
explain why a self-regarding B would not simply
take the initial benefit and run. Nor, since A should
figure this out, does it explain why he or she would
initially bear the small cost of helping. Assuming no
selection higher than the organism level, one would
expect evolutionary forces to reinforce this
calculus.
Game theorists understand that once individuals are embedded in a fabric of reciprocal interaction, self-regarding individuals may find it to their
benefit to continue cooperation. The problem of
explaining the origin of cooperation is distinct
from the challenge of explaining why it might be
sustained. Altruism (in the form of restraint on
harm) may be necessary to initiate a cooperative
relationship, but once embedded in a social context, the behavior can appear drained of altruistic
context. As Adam Smith said in The Wealth of
Nations, people do not depend on the benevolence
of the butcher or the baker for their sustenance but
on his self-interest.
A third approach acknowledges that in the evolutionary past, natural selection may have
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Altruism and Sociality

operated at levels above the individual organism.
The possibility of group or multilevel selection
remains controversial within biological discourse,
but many evolutionary biologists, including some
wbo originally distanced themselves from the idea,
such as E. 0. Wilson, have now embraced the view
that it provides the most coherent explanation of
how the altruistic predispositions that favor human
cooperation among non-kin could, upon first
appearance, have been favored.
Proponents of group or multilevel selection do
not dispute that the gene is the ultimate unit of
selection. But they seek to extend the principle,
acknowledged uncontroversially in the case of kin
selection, that in certain instances, genes predisposing toward behavior not in the survival or reproductive interest of the organism containing them might
nevertheless be favored by selection pressures.
In the case of kin selection, the argument is
simple and straightforward. In the case of genes
predisposing toward restraint on harming others
who are not closely related, the mechanics are
more complex. If human populations are dispersed
in small groups and if there is some random variation in the frequency of genes predisposing toward
restraint, groups characterized by higher frequencies of such genes will likely grow more rapidly.
And if the groups periodically pool and then reassort into smaller groups, the apparently paradoxical conclusion is that genes losing out in terms of
reproductive fitness at every moment of time in
every group may nevertheless increase over time in
a global population.

Final Thoughts
The history of mankind is of course marked by
horrendous violence and the premature deaths of
hundreds of millions of individuals at the hands of
other hwnans. Unprovoked preemptive attack is a
feature of hw11a11 '1u.-tory. .At the same time, one
can look at a wo rl d of mo re than 7 billion individuals and marvel not at the extent of conflict but
at its relative infrequency, which is one of the reasons conflict is newsworthy. Is this entirely the
result of a thin veneer of civilization or culture,
and, if so, why were and are individuals prepared
to accept some of these norms?
It is likely that humans have, in addition to their
proclivities toward self-regarding behavior, some

hardwired predispositions toward altruism. The
most empirically significant are those leading to
restraint on harming others. There is also a somewhat weaker predisposition toward affirmatively
helping others, including those who are non-kin.
Eacb of these predispositions can be strengthened
or weakened by training or acculturation.
Research in social psychology has demonstrated
that humans are quick to divide conspecifics into
in-groups and out-groups, with members of an
in-group most likely to benefit from both types of
altruism. These categorizations are, however,
malleable. Identifiable ethnic or racial markers
play a role, but culture can be as important. This is
a reminder that, although much behavior, including
that predisposing toward altruism and selfishness,
has a genetic and biological substrate, culture and
socialization are important influences on how
these predispositions manifest themselves.
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